An Executive Intelligence Brief by RepubliQ Global

Confidential – For Advisory Use

 

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​​Executive Assessment

The Red Sea, once a vital commercial artery, has transformed into a contested battlespace. Houthi forces have extended their strike capability further north, prompting Israeli counter-force raids in Yemen. Meanwhile, EU and U.S. coalitions persist in providing naval escorts and ISR coverage. The situation is further complicated by concurrent electronic warfare and subsea cable outages, leading carriers to reroute shipments around Africa. Major regional ports—including Suez, Jeddah, Yanbu, Djibouti, Berbera, and Port Sudan—are reinforcing defenses and reassessing their operational capacities.

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1. The Military Map: Chokepoints, Targets, and Weapons

Chokepoints: The Red Sea corridor is defined by two bottlenecks: Suez Canal (north, ~12% global trade, ~$9B annual revenue) and Bab el-Mandeb Strait (south, 18-nm wide). UKMTO reports (Sept 2025) flag GPS spoofing near Yanbu, Jeddah, and Port Sudan.

Houthi Arsenal: Includes C-802/Noor ASCMs, Quds-2 ballistic missiles, Samad UAVs, and explosive USVs. Signature tactic: multi-axis salvos to saturate ship defenses.

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2. The Intelligence Contest: ISR, EW, and Kill-Chain Disruption

ISR coverage relies on frigate radars, MALE UAVs, MPAs, and satellites. Coverage is thin relative to the theater size. EW disruptions (GNSS spoofing, AIS manipulation) complicate defense fire-control and navigation. Sept 2025 cable cuts (SMW4, IMEWE, Falcon, EIG) degraded regional connectivity and ISR flows.

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3. Ports Under Pressure: Security, Basing, and Competition

Saudi Arabia: Jeddah/Yanbu tightening IAMD & convoy SOPs. Egypt: Suez revenues fall as carriers reroute via Cape; rebates offered. Djibouti: Still Ethiopia’s lifeline and multi-nation base hub. Berbera: Emerging competitor with DP World upgrades. Port Sudan: Underused but strategically vital; EW disruptions logged nearby.

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4. World Consequences: Trade, Insurance, and Great-Power Friction

Cape of Good Hope rerouting adds 10–14 days, ~$1M fuel/insurance per voyage. Lloyd’s JWC lists Red Sea as war-risk zone, spiking rates after incidents. EU ASPIDES aircraft reported laser harassment by a Chinese warship, highlighting multi-power contest.

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5. Scenarios for the Next 6–12 Months

Managed Danger (Base Case) – Probability: 60% – Escorts + strikes keep losses rare, but risk premiums persist.

Northern Creep (Escalatory) – Probability: 30% – Strikes expand near Yanbu/Jeddah, insurer exclusions grow.

Dual-Domain Shock (Low Probability/High Impact) – Probability: 10% – Coordinated USV/ASBM strike + cable outage forces Cape routing for months.

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6. Actionable Recommendations

Defense & Governments: Expand IAMD & C-UAS at Jeddah, Yanbu, Djibouti, Berbera. Conduct mass-casualty & repair drills. Establish ISR fusion cells.

Carriers & Charterers: Treat corridor as war-risk by default. Use convoys, AIS discipline, and pre-plan Cape routing.

Insurers & Finance: Adjust premiums by escort participation & port hardening. Explore pooled war-risk guarantee schemes.

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Sources & Further Reading

CENTCOM: Strike updates on Houthi targets (Dec 2024–Apr 2025)
EU Council / EEAS: EUNAVFOR ASPIDES mandate and updates
UKMTO: Incident reports and Sept 2025 summary (GPS/AIS interference)
IISS: Houthi missile evolution & Operation Poseidon Archer
USNI News: CENTCOM strike sequences (early 2025)
Reuters: Israeli airstrikes (Sept 10–11, 2025) and Scarlet Ray attack (Sept 2, 2025)
Lloyd’s Joint War Committee: War-risk Listed Areas (2025)